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Laeken may well represent a milestone for Europe, in the
sense that it sets into motion a process that will culminate
in a major constitutional treaty in 2004. However, the
meeting of the European Council on 14-15 December
2001 bore more mixed results for foreign and security
policy.
The Belgian Presidency had of course steered the
Union’s response to the horrific events of 11 September.
The plan of action to combat terrorism, adopted by an
extraordinary European Council meeting of 21
September, progressed although securing agreement on
the European arrest warrant was not without glitches.
The response to the September attacks also saw an
enhancement of EU-Russia relations with a summit held
in Brussels on 3 October, which covered a range of topics
of mutual concern ranging from energy; the Kaliningrad
oblast; trade; and the elaboration of a Common European
Economic Area. The Belgian Presidency conclusions
also noted developments in the Western Balkans, most
notably the replacement of Bodo Hombach by Erhard
Busek as Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact. The
elections held in Kosovo on 17 November launched the
process of provisional self-government. Elsewhere,
notably in Africa, a Euro-African meeting in October
continued the dialogue initiated in Cairo in May 2000.
Two of the three annexes to the Presidency
Conclusions addressed external relations. The first was
a Declaration on the Operational Capability of the
Common European Security and Defence Policy.
Pressure had been mounting for the declaration since the
Nice European Council and this was only increased by
the events of 11 September. The declaration stated that:
Through the continuing development of the ESDP,
the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and
military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures,
the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management
operations. (Emphasis added)
Exactly which crisis-management operations the
declaration referred to remained vague, although the
reference is assumed to refer to the lower-end Petersberg
tasks (such as humanitarian and rescue tasks). This
assumption is based on significant qualifications that
appear in a later passage: ‘To enable the European
Union to carry out crisis-management operations over
the whole range of Petersberg tasks, including operations
which are the most demanding in terms of breadth,
period of deployment and complexity, substantial
progress will have to be made’. This will not be easy and
the attainment of ‘substantial progress’ underpins the
ambitious mandate of the Spanish Presidency.1
The Laeken summit took place in a mood of some
optimism since, ‘the Union intend[ed] to finalise the
security arrangements with NATO and to conclude
agreements on guaranteed access’ to a range of Alliance
assets and capabilities. Ankara, who charged the EU
members of NATO with reneging on an agreement made
at NATO’s Washington Summit in April 1999, had
blocked agreement on this issue. According to the April
1999 agreement, the ‘utmost importance’ should be
attached to ‘ensuring the fullest possible involvement
of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis response
operations, building on existing consultation
arrangements within the WEU’. It was also observed that
of the 16 potential regional conflict flash points, no less
than 13 were in Turkey’s proximity. As an associate
member of the WEU, Turkey enjoyed an active role in
decision-making on questions of security and defence
– rights that are not replicated in the ESDP setting.
In early December 2001 press reports surfaced of an
Anglo-American backed agreement with Turkey which,
apparently, addressed Ankara’s concerns and opened
up the way to the finalisation of the arrangements with
NATO.2 The prevailing optimism was soon quashed by
the rejection of the agreement by Greece on 16 December
(the day after the Laeken summit), on the grounds that
the agreement did not contain any assurances that
Turkey would not block an ESDP operation in the
Balkans – a region seen as vital to Greece’s security and
stability.3
The failure of the Ankara agreement has a number of
implications for the Laeken document. It does not, in the
first place, undermine the validity of the declaration on
operational capability for ‘some crisis-management
operations’. It does though pose a more fundamental
problem for how the EU will equip itself for the remaining
Petersberg tasks, in the absence of guarantees, or the
presumption of availability, of certain key NATO assets.
If the implication of the failure of the agreement is that
the EU will have to rely increasingly upon assets that are
independent from NATO (which may imply necessary
duplication by the EU of NATO assets), a second issue
will come to the fore.
The Belgian Presidency struggled to find a solution
to the funding of the EU Rapid Reaction Force prior to
the Laeken summit. The Presidency suggested three
funding scenarios: a minimum pre-funding amount
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(with military operations based on a pay-as-you-go
system); full scale funding based where contributions
would be based on national GNP; and, finally, a mix of
the first two. There was though no consensus on any of
the options prior to the summit, which presents the EU
Member States and the Spanish Presidency with the
question of how they meet the well-rehearsed
shortcomings of ESDP, based on the assumption that it
may not be possible to borrow NATO assets.4
The second annex concerned the Middle East. The
Declaration on the Situation in the Middle East was
though clouded by the decision by Israel, on the day
prior to Laeken, to break off all contact with Palestinian
leader Yasser Arafat, accusing him of doing too little to
stop terrorism. The subsequent apprehension of a vessel
full of largely Iranian origin arms, allegedly procured by
the Palestinian Authority, further complicated the
prospects for peace. The securing of peace in the Middle
East is a pressing matter for the Spanish Presidency,
since stability is vital for broader Mediterranean
prosperity.
The Presidency conclusions, as with previous ones,
reflect a mixture of accomplishments and unfinished
work. The events of 11 September prompted speedy
action on counter-terrorism and a good deal were
implemented with impressive speed. Much though
remains to be completed, such as enhanced co-operation
between the Member States to counter chemical or
biological threats. The essential links between the
internal efforts to counter terrorism (predominantly
Justice and Home Affairs) and the external dimensions
(found in both the first and second pillars) have also to
be made; again, an item that is squarely on the agenda
of the Spanish Presidency.
The declaration on operational capability of ESDP
is less bold than may appear at first glance, since only
the most modest operations can currently be undertaken.
Furthermore, there is the very real danger that the
declaration may have been premature since, by not
specifying which crisis-management operations the
Union might conduct, false expectations may arise. The
Union has not, in other words, resolved the capability-
expectations gap by means of the declaration. The
sticking points for ESDP (and thus the Spanish Presidency
agenda) remain those of resources and the Union’s
relations with NATO. It would though be unfair to point
the finger at the Belgian, or any other, Presidency for the
shortcomings in addressing these two vital issues.
Ultimately, it is up to the Member States to provide
answers. The Presidency can and should act as a catalyst.
________________
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